The Nature of Man. by Edmond Hearn, John
THE NATURE OF MAN
BY JOHN EDMOND HEARN
WHAT do we know about the nature of man? Very little, and
mainly because man can not know himself. "We are unknown,
we knowers, ourselves to ourselves," says Nietzsche, and he com-
pares us to one who, "sunken in the seas of his own soul, in whose
ear the clock has just thundered with all its force its twelve strokes
of noon, suddenly wakes up, and asks himself, 'What has in point
of fact just struck?' So do we at times rub afterward, as it were,
our puzzled ears, and ask in complete astonishment and complete
embarrassment, 'Through what have we in point of fact just lived?'
further, 'Who are we in point of fact?' and count, after they have
struck, all the twelve throbbing beats of the clock of our experience,
of our life, of our being—ah !—and count wrong."
But where direct knowledge is denied us, we may make the best
of indirect. No one ever saw a vitamin, but we do not deny the
existence of the accessory food substance on that account. And
really we know a great deal about them without knowing them. It is
possible even, by appropriate manipulation, to secure vitamins m
a fair state of purity ; how far it is impossible to say, because there
is no standard of comparison. Apart from a few of their physio-
logical properties, our knowledge of them is largely negative. We
may examine a mass of material and may find that it does not con-
tain certain chemical elements although it contains vitamins. Then
we conclude that vitamins do not contain the certain elements. But
when we find that the mass does contain a certain element, we can
not conclude that vitamins do contain it, for it may be present as
an impurity, in the matter surrounding the vitamin but not in the
vitamin.
It is not possible to apply chemical manipulation to man. We
can not secure him in even a fair state of purity. And when certain
things are alleged about man, it may be that they are true not of
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man himself, not of pure man, but of impurities which cHng to him.
But if it is impossible to develop a technique for purifying the
creature, we may at any rate question some of the allegations about
him and try to decide whether they apply really to him himself.
"To the eye of vulgar Logic," says Carlyle, "what is man? An
omnivorous Biped that wears breeches."
Is he omnivorous? The best diet for an animal of any species
is that to which he is naturally adapted. His natural diet is that
to which he was earliest accustomed, provided he has not passed
through any evolutionary changes which make such a diet unsuitable
at the present time.
Ovid, in describing the Golden Age of the Greeks, says that men
fed on fruit, without meat.
As to man's ancestors. Elliot of Oxford, in his recent work on
"Prehistoric Man," declares that "there was not, so far as we are
aware, any carnivorous creature in the Eocene period."
Genus homo belongs to the order of Primates, which includes
men, monkeys, and lemurs, and his natural or primitive diet is the
same as that of his order—fruits, nuts, tender shoots and bulbs,
which were found in the primitive home, the forest. It was after
leaving the forest, according to United States Forester Graves, that
man began to prey upon the animals of the plains.
Is man a biped? No; there is no room for doubt that primitive
man walked on all fours, and many anatomists believe that he
changed prematurely from the horizontal to the vertical position.
Dr. J. K. Thompson says that the upright position causes the gravi-
tation of the blood and waste products in the circulation to the
abdomen and the lower limbs, this congestion bringing on disorders
of various kinds. Most people, he thinks, would benefit by walk-
ing quadruped-fashion part of the time and by exercising in the
horizontal position.
We need not discuss the bifurcated garments that most men
wear, except to remark that Carlyle's definition rules out some men
and most women, and we had thought that he used the term man
in the generic sense.
But Carlyle, as you will remember, does not stop with his mate-
rialistic definition but gives a metaphysical one also : "To the eye of
pure reason what is he? A Soul, a Spirit, and divine Apparition."
This is not very enlightening. It is the identification of some-
thing we little know with something we know not at all.
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It is a curious fact that men are offended at the correct definition
of man. Alan is an animal, but he sometimes hates to acknowledge
it. "Every member and organ of his body has its counterpart or
analog in the bodies of other animals," says W. H. Thompson. "The
brain of the chimpanzee, as far as structure goes, presents us with
not only every lobe but with every convolution of the human brain."
Korzybski, the author of "The Manhood of Humanity," seems
to think that men are not animals. He divides life into three parts
:
plants, the chemistry-binders ; animals, the space-binders ; men, the
time-binders. No one doubts that men have some qualities that
lower animals lack, but to make a separate classification of men
because they can fuse, in their minds, the past, present, and future
into an eternal present tense seems hardly necessary, especially as
it is not known wdiether an intelligent dog can perform that feat.
Doctor Crile's exceedingly useful description of man as an adap-
tive mechanism, as a sensitive being immersed in a hostile environ-
ment, applies not exclusively to man.
Paul Lafargue has shown that man can not be distinguished from
other animals by the ability to entertain abstract ideas. The idea of
number is the abstract idea par excellence, and a pigeon, if robbed
of the second egg she lays, will lay a third, and a fourth and fifth if
the eggs are taken as fast as she lays them. She will sit upon two
eggs, not more nor less. She shares with man the abstract idea ol
number.
Of all the definitions of man, perhaps the Nietzschean characteri-
zation of him as the animal that can promise is the best: whence
it may be said to follow that the ignoblest member of the species
is the man who repudiates or forgets his promises.
The bare possession of the social sense does not distinguish man
from the other animals. Even earthworms are social. And there
are men who are not much more social than earthworms. On the
higher levels, sociability becomes an esthetic affair ; but even there
the difference is in degree rather than in kind—a quantitative, not
a qualitative, difference.
It is generally conceded that the possession of intelligence roughly
divides mankind from the beasts, although a two-year-old dog is
more intelligent than a two-year-old child. Recent experiments with
scopolamin have shown that the intellect may be put to sleep with-
out interfering with the speech center. A subject in this so-called
twilight sleep may talk, but, when the drug works to suit the oper-
ator, the subject can not tell a lie. The reason for this is that the
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intellect is necessary for deception. If man is the only intelligent
creature, then he is the only liar. But even insects can play dead
to deceive their enemies.
It is a peculiarly human idiosyncrasy that one man while listen-
ing to a recital of the woes of another has his attention focused on
his own troubles and his friend's woes are seen dimly at the outer
range of his vision. This has been observed so often of humans,
and never of non-humans, that the probability is that it is a trait
at least predominantly human.
Man is narrow-minded, but for all we know not more so than
other animals. Among the various ways in which this narrow-
mindedness is manifested is in the inability of a man to appreciate
the worth of another man's work and interests. I was speaking to
a friend about a fundamental problem in philosophy and of William
James's contribution toward its solution. After listening quietly
for a moment, my friend, smiling engagingly, said : "Which is about
as important as the distinction between tweedledum and tweedledee."
Man is a religious animal. It is probable that pigs neither pray
nor swear. Swearing is the expression, hardly of religion, but at
any rate of religiosity.
Reverence for something greater than himself is a universal
property of man. He may blaspheme God. he may despise intellect,
but there is always something greater than himself which he rever-
ences. Sometimes this shows in his complaints. He may complain
that there is no justice in the world. Thereby he shows his deep
reverence for justice. Perhaps he is right. Perhaps there is no
justice in the Avorld—in his world, which is made up of a grasping
landlord, a penny-saving employer, and himself.
Schopenhauer admonished his students, Avhen they met with any
disagreeable trait in human nature, merely to make a note of it. It
may not be true that all knowledge is useful : one's attitude toward
knowledge is the important thing. The student of insects finds inter-
est in every insect trait. The student of man should find interest in
every human trait.
These traits, pleasant and unpleasant, may be divided into those
of instinct and those of intelligence. But instinct is a sort of intel-
ligence, and perhaps the diiterentiation should be between the traits
which are under the control of the subconscious mind and those con-
trolled by the conscious mind.
An act which has been repeated so often as to become a matter
of unconscious habit mav at first have been harmless to anv one
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and yet later it may become offensive. A man who smokes in the
presence of those who disHke tobacco smoke (if such people still
exist) may not realize that he is doing anything reprehensible; but
he should get into communication with his conscious mind.
The observer of the traits of men will soon see that many men
live a sort of automatic life, made up mostly of habit. It is the
exceptional man who orders his own life, changing his habits at will,
knowing that even a fairly good habit may become bad by losing
connection with conscious intelligence.
It is presumably in the interest of the unexceptional that reform-
ers of the present day are endeavoring to make self-control super-
fluous. It is conceivable that paternalism may go so far as to endan-
ger the supremacy of man over the lower animals rather than to
exalt the monofanatics to the position of missing link between man
and superman. For "end on" evolution has been discredited. There
is, according to modern ideas, to quote Dr. F. Wood Jones of the
University of London, "no march of progress to perfection along a
single line." It seems logical to presume, with Professor Dendy,
that the successor of man will arise from "some unspecialized off-
shoot of the human race," rather than from a group of highly
specialized reformers who constitute the very pinnacle of perfected
humanity.
Aside from the question of man's successor, the improvement
of the race will probably depend rather on the leading of the people
to an appreciation of the inexorability of the natural laws applicable
to all animal life, including our own, than on legislation.
Man's origin, from the point of view of biology, was lowly ; but
his destiny may be greater than we of the present dream. His origin,
from the non-physical point of view, many people think was not
lowly. They regard him as an emanation from the Most High (but
evil itself is an emanation from God if the Plotinian doctrine is car-
ried to its logical end), and think that his destiny can not be less
great than his origin ; that his progress is determined by his own
aspiration, volition, and imagination ; that he must visualize himself
as a god in order to achieve his ineffable destiny.
Whatever the destiny of the human race, it will not have existed
in vain if from it arises a greater than itself. And that greater one
may be able to pass judgment on the nature of man.
